Abandoning the ‘Mosaic Theory’: Why the ‘Mosaic Theory’ of Securities Analysis Constitutes Illegal Insider Trading and What to Do About It by Davidowitz, Aaron S.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 46 Emerging Ideas in Law 
2015 
Abandoning the ‘Mosaic Theory’: Why the ‘Mosaic Theory’ of 
Securities Analysis Constitutes Illegal Insider Trading and What to 
Do About It 
Aaron S. Davidowitz 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aaron S. Davidowitz, Abandoning the ‘Mosaic Theory’: Why the ‘Mosaic Theory’ of Securities Analysis 
Constitutes Illegal Insider Trading and What to Do About It, 46 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 281 (2015), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
281 
Abandoning the ‘Mosaic Theory’: Why the ‘Mosaic 
Theory’ of Securities Analysis Constitutes Illegal 
Insider Trading and What to Do About It 
Aaron S. Davidowitz

 
INTRODUCTION 
In Dirks v. SEC
1
 the United States Supreme Court appeared to 
recognize the legality of the mosaic theory of securities analysis, in 
which analysts obtain fragments of information from company 
insiders and then utilize those fragments to create a mosaic of 
information used to value the company’s worth.2 “It is commonplace 
for analysts to ferret out and analyze information,” the Court stated, 
“and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate 
officers and others who are insiders.”3 Since Dirks was decided in 
1983, however, much has changed in the legal landscape of insider 
trading.
4
 As a result, the mosaic theory, once viewed by investment 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2015), Washington University School of Law; MBA Candidate 
(2015), Washington University Olin Business School; B.A. (2008), Union College. Thank you 
to my family and friends. And special thanks to my tireless partner, Claire, whose help 
throughout the writing, and particularly the editing, process made this Note publishable. 
Without her none of my achievements would be as memorable, or even possible. 
 1. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 2. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, Insider Trading: 2010 Review, 5 (2010), available at 
http://www. mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110223-Insider-Trading-2010-Review.pdf. 
 3. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (internal citations omitted). 
 4. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Winning Record of Prosecutors on Insider Trading, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/the-winning-record-of-
prosecutors-of-insider-trading/ (“Defendants convicted in an insider trading trial appear to have 
little hope of avoiding time in a federal correctional institution”); Bill Saporito & Massimo 
Calabresi, The Street Fighter, TIME MAG. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,2105971,00.html (highlighting the recent use of wiretaps, cooperators, 
and other prosecutorial investigative tactics in insider trading cases); Steve Schaefer, Wall 
Street Sherriff Preet Bharara Talks Insider Trading, FORBES (July 18, 2012), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/07/18/wall-street-sheriff-preet-bharara-talks-insider-trading/ 
(identifying the multitude of recent high profile insider trading prosecutions against individuals 
such as Raj Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta); James B Stewart, In a New Era of Insider Trading, 
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banks, hedge funds, expert network firms,
5
 and other securities firms 
as a reliable method of information gathering, may now be in 
jeopardy.
6
 
Concerns surrounding the mosaic theory have arisen as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and local and federal 
prosecutors continue to devote increasing resources to regulating and 
prosecuting illegal insider trading.
7
 While the definition is 
occasionally thought of as “ambiguous and overinclusive,”8 illegal 
insider trading occurs “when a person buys or sells a security while in 
possession of material nonpublic information that was obtained in 
 
It’s Risk vs. Reward Squared, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/ 
business/insider-trading-persists-and-gets-stealthier.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (recognizing 
that while insider trading has long been investigated, regulated, and prosecuted, nowadays 
prosecutors “have exposed a vast network of insider trading” that “dwarfs that of the earlier 
era” in its sophistication, breadth, and profits). 
 5. “Expert network firms” are “research consulting firms that provide market intelligence 
by connecting clients—mostly institutional investors such as hedge funds—with persons with 
specialized expertise in the clients’ areas of interest. For example, investors in the 
pharmaceutical field may gain valuable insights from certain doctors. These research outfits 
pool together vast networks of experts who can provide unique perspectives and insights to 
various industries.” MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 5. 
 6. In October 2009, in the midst of the federal insider trading case against billionaire 
hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
cautioned: “This case should be a wake up call for Wall Street. It should be a wake call for 
every hedge fund manager and every Wall Street trader and every corporate executive who is 
even thinking about engaging in insider trading. As the defendants in this case have now 
learned the hard way, they may have been privy to a lot of confidential corporate information, 
but there was one secret they did not know: we were listening.” Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Hedge Fund Managers, Fortune 500 Executives, and 
Management Consulting Director in $20 Million Insider Trading Case (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo101609.htm. 
 7. Both the Department of Justice and the SEC have “continued to generate headlines 
with insider trading investigations, prosecutions, and enforcement actions.” MORRISON & 
FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1. In 2010 alone, the SEC filed thirty-three insider trading actions, 
while the Department of Justice brought criminal insider trading charges against twenty five 
individuals. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1. “In terms of both the number of cases 
and the scope of the investigations . . . regulators made clear that ‘insider trading continued to 
be a priority.’” MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. 
of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech to the Society of American Business 
Editors and Writers (SABEW) (Mar. 19, 2010)). 
 8. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1; see also Kathleen F. Brickey, 
CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 162–63 (5th ed. 2011) (stating that insider trading “is 
a controversial subject” which opponents, including the SEC and the Justice Department, 
“believe . . . must be curbed if investors are to have confidence in the market,” while “insider 
trading proponents argue that it should remain unregulated because it promotes market 
efficiency”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/13
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breach of a fiduciary duty or relationship of trust.”9 Indeed, courts, 
regulators, and prosecutors have given broad meaning to this 
definition,
10
 particularly since the economic crisis of 2008. As a 
result, the prevalence of ongoing insider trading cases, such as the 
high profile cases against Raj Rajaratnam,
11
 Rajat Gupta,
12
 Doug 
Whitman,
13
 and others
14—and the unsuccessful outcomes for the 
defendants in each of those cases—indicates that the mosaic theory is 
eroding as a valid method of securities analysis.
15
 
In this Note, I propose that the mosaic theory is an unlawful 
method of securities analysis constituting illegal insider trading based 
on the tipper/tippee theory of liability established in Dirks.
16
 I also 
propose that as illegal insider trading continues to be investigated and 
prosecuted with increasing vigor, the mosaic theory will continue to 
erode, due in large part to broadening beliefs by courts about what 
constitutes material nonpublic information.
17
 Due to these changes, 
securities analysts will need to reassess the methods they use to 
 
 9. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1; see also Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (“Illegal 
insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or 
other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic 
information about the security”). 
 10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 11. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-CR-1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, No. 11-4416-CR, F.3d, 6 2013 WL 3155848 (2d Cir. June 24, 2013). 
 12. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 13. United States v. Whitman, No. 12 CR. 125(JSR), 2012 WL 5505080 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
14, 2012). 
 14. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 17–20 (listing over thirty individual- or 
entity-defendants involved in ongoing criminal or SEC insider trading cases as of the end of 
2010). 
 15. Rajaratnam, Gupta, and Whitman all tried—and failed—to successfully use the 
mosaic theory defense in their federal jury trials. See infra notes 77, 78, 81.  
 16. See David T. Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal Benefit 
Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider 
Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006) (noting that Dirks tipper/tippee theory of liability 
held that “where a corporate insider discloses material, nonpublic information to one who then 
uses that information to trade in the stock of the insider’s corporation, the corporate insider and 
the trader” are liable when the tipper personally benefits from making the tip.”). 
 17. While insider trading statutes and SEC regulations have failed to define the scope of 
material nonpublic information, courts have taken up the task, giving broad meaning to the 
term. See infra notes 87, 92 and accompanying text. As such, the well-established test for 
materiality is whether the information would be important to a reasonable investor when 
considered in the “total mix” of available information. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  
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obtain information. Furthermore, hedge funds, investment banks, and 
other firms employing securities analysts will consequently need to 
reassess their training and compliance programs in order to institute a 
corporate culture in which analysts rely on investor relations officers 
or other legitimate sources for information, as opposed to illegitimate 
company insiders operating under confidentiality agreements. 
Part I of this Note addresses the meaning and history of the 
mosaic theory as it has evolved over time. Part II discusses the 
history of insider trading law in the United States in an effort to 
understand why the mosaic theory violates those laws. Part III 
analyzes the confluence of insider trading law and the mosaic theory, 
showing why the mosaic theory indeed violates insider trading law. 
Finally, Part IV identifies the costs and benefits of abandoning the 
mosaic theory in its current form and proposes ways to move forward 
in the world of securities analysis without the legal risks embedded in 
the mosaic theory. This Note concludes that financial actors will need 
to abandon the mosaic theory in order to confidently guard against 
prosecution for insider training. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE MOSAIC THEORY 
The mosaic theory is a method of research used by securities 
analysts to gather information about a company.
18
 The theory 
involves collecting pieces of information about a company in order to 
determine the underlying value of the company’s securities and to 
enable the analyst to make recommendations to clients based on that 
information.
19
 As The New York Times’ leading financial contributor, 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, explains,  
Every day, professional investors and research analysts work 
the phones to ferret out information about companies that can’t 
be found by simply reading news releases. Some will walk 
through shopping malls interviewing store managers . . . to 
gauge how sales are going. Others might monitor sales of 
certain component parts in Asia to determine how many iPads 
 
 18. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 19. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/13
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Apple might sell this quarter. . . . Investors use multiple tidbits 
of nonpublic information from various sources to build a 
“mosaic” to try to get an edge on other investors. For better or 
worse, that is what passes as “research” in the finance world.20 
But the legality of the mosaic theory is being questioned as people 
such as Sorkin—and more importantly, prosecutors, regulators, and 
judges—begin to ask whether this method of information gathering 
captures “just tidbits, or material facts for insider trading.”21  
As early as the 1970s, various courts noted the validity of the 
mosaic theory process, even before the term was coined.
22
 In the 
Second Circuit case SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
23
 the court noted 
that, “corporate management may reveal to securities analysts or 
inquirers non-public information that merely fills interstices in 
analysis.”24 Similarly, in the 1980 case Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, 
Inc.,
25
 the Second Circuit reaffirmed the validity of the theory, stating 
that, “a skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the 
industry may piece seemingly inconsequential data together with 
public information into a mosaic which reveals material non-public 
 
 20. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Just Tidbits, or Material Facts for Insider Trading?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/just-tidbits-or-material-facts-
for-insider-trading/. Sorkin explains that “while it has long been considered standard practice to 
ask the local GAP store manager how sales are going, the store manager’s answer may actually 
fall into a gray area” based on whether the information provided is material. Id. Therefore, 
while “knowing the sales at one GAP store isn’t material” due to the large number of GAP 
stores across the country, “if you went store to store and managed to find out sales figures for” a 
significant number of stores, “you might have something closer to material information.” Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); Elkind v. Liggett & 
Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 23. 565 F.2d at 8. The SEC brought this case against Bausch & Lomb and the chairman of 
its board of directors claiming that the board chairman had tipped off securities analysts to 
earnings estimates and other information that was not available to the general public. Id. at 10–
12. The court held that injunctive relief was properly denied because the disclosure of the 
material, nonpublic information was an isolated incident that was unlikely to recur. Id. at 18–
19. 
 24. Id. at 14. 
 25. 635 F.2d 156. A shareholder brought this securities fraud class action against the 
corporation based on tipped information. Id. at 158. The court held that the company could not 
be held liable for tipping certain nonpublic information to analysts because such information 
was not material; however, the court held that other tipped information was material since it 
involved earnings numbers. Id. at 158, 173. 
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information.”26 Finally, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize the 
legitimacy of the mosaic theory in Dirks,
27
 the seminal 1983 case, 
whereby the Court accepted analysts’ common practice of meeting 
with company insiders to “ferret out and analyze information”28 and 
then using such information as “the basis for judgments as to the 
market worth of a corporation’s securities.”29 
Questions regarding the mosaic theory’s continued legality have 
arisen due to the SEC’s implementation of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (“Regulation FD”),30 promulgated in August 2000 and 
effective since October of that year.
31
 While Regulation FD dictates 
that “an issuer cannot render material information immaterial simply 
by breaking it into ostensibly non-material pieces,”32 the SEC 
seemingly attempted to allay any fears regarding the erosion of the 
mosaic theory as a legal method of analysis.
33
 The SEC noted that a 
company “is not prohibited from disclosing a nonmaterial piece of 
information to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that 
 
 26. Id. at 165 (internal citations omitted). 
 27. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 28. Id. at 658. 
 29. Id. at 658–59. According to The New York Times’ financial contributor, Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, any upcoming cases that are brought challenging the mosaic theory will likely be 
analyzed against Dirks. Sorkin, supra note 20. 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 243. Regulation FD was promulgated in order to “address concerns about 
the selective disclosure of material information.” MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 6. 
Upon enacting the regulation, the SEC explained that “[m]any issuers are disclosing important 
nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or 
selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same information to 
the general public. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information 
beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.” 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P22_3882 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). As a result, 
Regulation FD required that when material nonpublic information was disclosed “to certain 
individuals or entities—generally, securities market professionals, such as stock analysts, or 
holders of the issuer’s securities who may well trade on the basis of the information”—the 
information also be publicly disclosed. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 6. 
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 243. 
 32. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P22_3882 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 33. The SEC explicitly acknowledged that securities “[a]nalysts can provide valuable 
service in sifting through and extracting information that would not be significant to the 
ordinary investor to reach material conclusions . . . [and that Regulation FD was not intended 
to] discourage this sort of activity.” U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/33-7881.htm#P22_3882 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/13
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piece helps the analyst complete a ‘mosaic’ of information that, taken 
together, is material.”34 As a result, “Regulation FD is not violated 
where an issuer discloses immaterial information that is significant in 
completing an analyst’s mosaic of information.”35 The crux of the 
issue, therefore, lies in scope of what constitutes “material” 
information. 
II. THE HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Understanding the contours of insider trading law in the United 
States is essential to effectively evaluating whether the mosaic theory 
constitutes illegal insider trading. According to the SEC, “illegal 
insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in 
breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information 
about the security.”36 However, insider trading laws in the United 
States are “rooted in the common law tradition”37 of liability for 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC’s New Regulation FD and It’s 
Impact on Market Participants, 77 IND. L.J. 551, 567 (2002). 
 36. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
insider.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). In a 2008 speech, the director of enforcement for the 
SEC defined insider trading as “the purchase or sale of securities, with scienter (or guilty 
knowledge), while in possession of material, non-public information in breach of a duty arising 
out of a fiduciary relationship or other relationship of trust and confidence.” Linda Chatman 
Thomsen, Dir. Div. of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Remarks Before the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2008 Summer School: U.S. Experience of 
Insider Trading Enforcement (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/ 
spch021908lct.htm. This is in contrast to legal insider trading, whereby “corporate insiders—
officers, directors, and employees—buy and sell stock in their own companies” and then report 
their trades to the SEC, as required by regulation. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm.  
 37. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir. Div. of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N, Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective (Sept. 19, 1998) (noting that our legal system is 
based on the Common Law system of England, which established the original source for 
prohibitions against insider trading tactics of fraud and deception), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm. 
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deception and fraud.
38
 Congress has also played an important role in 
shaping insider trading law.
39
  
In response to the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted 
the Securities Act of 1933
40
 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934
41
 (the “Exchange Act”), statutes that were 
“aimed at controlling abuses believed to have contributed to the 
crash.”42 The Exchange Act addresses insider trading directly in 
Section 16(b)
43
 by regulating the trading activities of corporate 
 
 38. Historically, the element of mens rea, or a “vicious will,” per Blackstone, was 
required at common law for any criminal conviction. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 251 (1952). Mens rea, in this context, became loosely synonymous with terms such as 
“criminal intent,” “malice aforethought,” and “scienter.” Id. at 252. The Supreme Court, in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, defined “scienter” as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.” 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). The rationale for this requirement was that 
for someone to be culpable in the criminal context, where the punishment was so severe (death 
for all felonies at common law) and the stain on one’s record so serious, the prosecution should 
be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact intended the wrongful 
act. See, e.g., Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270 (holding that the defendant could not be guilty of the 
crime of “unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly steal[ing] and convert[ing]” property of the 
United States without the requisite intent or mens rea).  
 39. Senator Duncan Fletcher, the sponsor of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
identified the importance of Congressional action:  
“Manipulators who have in the past had a comparatively free hand to befuddle and 
fool the public and to extract from the public millions of dollars through stock-
exchange operations are to be curbed and deprived of the opportunity to grow fat on 
the savings of the average man and woman of America. Under this bill the securities 
exchanges will not only have the appearance of an open market place for investors but 
will be truly open to them, free from the hectic operations and dangerous practices 
which in the past have enabled a handful of men to operate with stacked cards against 
the general body of the outside investors.”  
78 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher), quoted in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 765 (1975).  
 40. Pub. L. No. 73-38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)). 
Also referred to as the Truth in Securities Act, the Federal Securities Act, and the ’33 Act. 
 41. Pub. L. No. 73-404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj 
(1994)). Also referred to as the Exchange Act and the ’34 Act.  
 42. Newkirk, supra note 37; see also Christopher D. Jones, Note, The Misappropriation 
Theory of Rule 10B-5: The Ultimate Deception, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 439, 439 (1997) (noting that 
the “haunting memory of the economic despair during the 1930’s Great Depression was a 
powerful motivation for Congressional regulation of crucial aspects of American’s economy,” 
inducing Congress to enact the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act “prohibits short-swing 
profits (profits realized in any period less than six months) by corporate insiders in their own 
corporation’s stock, except in very limited circumstance. It applies only to directors or officers 
of the corporation and those holding greater than 10% of the stock and is designed to prevent 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol46/iss1/13
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insiders, such as company directors and officers. The Exchange Act 
also addresses insider trading indirectly through Section 10(b),
44
 
which broadly bans “manipulative or deceptive”45 practices involving 
the sale of securities. Because Section 10(b) does not merely prohibit 
corporate insiders from particular trading activities, it quickly became 
the leading tool for regulating and prosecuting illegal insider 
trading.
46
  
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states that it shall be unlawful 
for any person “to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
[SEC] may prescribe.”47 To implement Section 10(b), the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942, making it unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements . . . not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.
48
 
In sum, Rule 10b-5 establishes “broad anti-fraud provisions, 
mak[ing] it unlawful to engage in fraud or misrepresentation in 
 
insider trading by those most likely to be privy to important information.” Newkirk, supra note 
37; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory 
Constriction of Section 16(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NOTE DAME L. REV. 
33, 34–36 (1992). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). 
 45. Id. 
 46. This is due in large part to the fact that the anti-fraud provisions stipulated in Section 
16(b) were “relatively easy to apply to the corporate insider who secretly traded in his own 
company’s stock while in possession of inside information because such behavior fit within 
traditional notions of fraud.” Newkirk, supra note 38. On the other hand, whether Section 10(b) 
prohibited insider trading by non-insiders was not as clear based on the plain the language of 
the statute. Id. 
 47. Pub. L. No. 73-404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj 
(1994)). 
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). 
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connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”49 However, 
because Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are not limited to insider 
trading, the most important developments in insider trading law have 
come from the federal courts.
50
 
Beginning in the 1960s, the courts in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.
51
 
and S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
52
 broadly construed the 
statutory language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, holding that 
anyone in possession of insider information could be liable for illegal 
insider trading.
53
 However, the 1980 Supreme Court case of 
Chiarella v. United States
54
 narrowed the scope of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. The Court in Chiarella held that merely trading on 
material nonpublic information was not sufficient to trigger 
 
 49. Newkirk, supra note 37. 
 50. Id. 
 51. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 52. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 53. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. The court in Cady, Roberts identified that the 
obligation not to engage in insider trading rested on two principal elements: (1) “the existence 
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available 
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,” and (2) “the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is 
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” Id. The court further noted that “[i]n considering 
these elements under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be 
circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is to identify 
those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, 
and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest 
the uninformed be exploited.” Id.; see also Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 851–52 (reaffirming the 
ruling in Cady Roberts and stating that “[t]he core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the 
Congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of 
participation in securities transactions . . . [as] [i]t was the intent of Congress that all members 
of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks”). 
 54. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  In Chiarella, the Supreme Court reversed the criminal 
conviction of a printer who had obtained nonpublic information regarding “corporate takeover 
bids” from documents he was hired to print. Id. at 224, 233. The printer subsequently purchased 
stock based on the information, making a profit of more than $30,000. Id. at 224. The case was 
tried on the theory that, by failing to disclose the information, the printer engaged in fraud in 
violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 226. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court refused to 
accept the theory advanced by the lower courts that “the use by anyone of material information 
not generally available is fraudulent [merely] because such information gives certain buyers or 
sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.” Id. at 232. Instead, the Court 
held that a specific corporate relationship must exist before liability will be warranted. Id. at 
232–33. In this case, the Court found that “[n]o duty could arise from [the printer’s] relationship 
with the sellers of the target company’s securities, for [he] had no prior dealings with them. 
[H]e was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence.” Id. at 232. 
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liability.
55
 The Court noted that “a duty to disclose under [Section] 
10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information” because “there can be no fraud absent a duty to 
speak.”56  
The most significant aspect of the Chiarella decision came not 
from the majority’s holding, however, but from Chief Justice 
Burger’s dissent.57 According to Burger, liability under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 was proper based solely on the fact that the defendant 
“misappropriated” confidential information and wrongfully used it 
for personal gain.
58
 This interpretation of the Exchange Act’s 
provisions, known as the misappropriation theory, has become an 
accepted basis for insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.
59
 
Three years after Chiarella, the Supreme Court in Dirks addressed 
Chief Justice Burger’s misappropriation theory as it related to the 
liability of tippees—those who receive information from an inside 
tipper.
60
 Raymond Dirks, an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm, received material nonpublic information from an inside tipper 
 
 55. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. 
 56. Id. at 235. 
 57. Id. at 239–45. 
 58. Id. at 240. Justice Burger stated that a proper reading of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
meant “that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to 
disclose that information or to refrain from trading” regardless of the lack of a special 
relationship of trust or confidence. Id. Justice Burger arrived at this understanding by focusing 
on the plain language of the provisions, which “[b]y their terms . . . reach any person engaged 
in any fraudulent scheme. This broad language negates the suggestion that congressional 
concern was limited to trading by ‘corporate insiders’ or to deceptive practices related to 
‘corporate information.’” Id. As such, Justice Burger proclaimed that the “very language of 
[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ‘by repeated use of the word ‘any’ [was] obviously meant to be 
inclusive.’” Id. at 241 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 
(1972)). 
 59. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the misappropriation 
theory is one of the two “primary theories of insider trading,” imposing liability on anyone 
“who improperly obtains material nonpublic information and then trades based on such 
information”); see also United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16–17 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after 
remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (where the Second 
Circuit adopted Justice Burger’s misappropriation theory, holding that an individual with no 
fiduciary relationship to an issuer could nonetheless be liable under Rule 10b-5). 
 60. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that insider trading law “holds 
liable any tippee—that is, someone with whom . . . the tipper shares the information—as long 
as the tippee also knows that the information was obtained in breach of a duty”). 
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of a corporation with which he had no connection.
61
 Dirks 
subsequently disclosed the information to investors “who relied on it 
in trading in the shares of the corporation.”62 Recognizing that in 
certain situations tippees, such as Dirks, should be liable under Rule 
10b-5, the Court held that a tippee assumes a “fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic 
information . . . when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to 
the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the 
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”63 
However, the Court held that Dirks escaped liability under the 
circumstances since the inside tipper “disclosed the information . . . 
for the purpose of exposing a fraud and not for personal gain.”64 
Following Dirks, in the 1986 case Carpenter v. United States,
65
 
the Supreme Court again addressed the misappropriation theory and 
again adopted Chief Justice Burger’s broader perception of liability.66 
Quoting an earlier New York state court decision, the Court stated: 
“It is well established, as a general proposition, that a person who 
acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that 
 
 61.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 660; see also Newkirk, supra note 37 (stating that “Dirks held that tippees are 
liable if they knew or had reason to believe that the tipper had breached a fiduciary duty in 
disclosing confidential information and the tipper received a direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure”). 
 64. Newkirk, supra note 37. Another significant aspect of the Dirks ruling was contained 
in footnote 14 of the opinion, where the Court formulated the “concept of the ‘constructive 
insiders’—outside lawyers, consultants, investment bankers or others—who legitimately 
receive confidential information from a corporation in the course of providing services to the 
corporation.” Newkirk, supra note 37. These constructive insiders “acquire the fiduciary duties 
of the true insider, provided the corporation expected the constructive insider to keep the 
information confidential.” Newkirk, supra note 37.  
 65. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The Carpenter case involved a financial columnist for the Wall 
Street Journal, whose influential columns affected stock prices of the companies discussed in 
the paper. Id. at 22. The columnist tipped information regarding his upcoming columns to 
others (outside of the Wall Street Journal) and then shared in the profits that those individuals 
had made by trading prior to the publication of the columns. Id. at 23. In upholding the 
conviction of the columnist for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit rejected 
the argument that the misappropriation theory only applies to information misappropriated by 
corporate or constructive insiders. Id. at 24. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which, while divided about whether the defendant engaged in securities fraud, unanimously 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s ruling on mail and wire fraud convictions. Id. at 28.  
 66. See id. 
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knowledge or information for his own personal benefit.”67 In the 
wake of Dirks and Carpenter, Chief Justice Burger’s 
misappropriation theory began to gain widespread acceptance in 
federal courts.
68
 
Finally, in the 1997 case United States v. O’Hagan,69 the Supreme 
Court “explicitly adopted the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading,”70 creating a significant milestone in defining the scope of 
Rule 10b-5. The O’Hagan Court stated that Chief Justice Burger’s 
misappropriation theory accurately recognized that a person 
“commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and 
thereby violates [Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading 
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information.”71 The Court went on to explain that “[i]n lieu of 
premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company 
insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the 
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-
trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to 
confidential information.”72 
 
 67. Id. at 27–28 (quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969)). 
 68. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 
771 F.2d 818, 822–23 (3d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1990); SEC v. 
Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990). In 1995 and 1996, however, two federal courts 
rejected the misappropriation theory. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 
1995); United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996). The Eight Circuit in 
O’Hagan rejected the misappropriation theory on the grounds that the theory “does not require 
either a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure.” 92 F.3d at 618. Additionally, the court 
claimed that the theory was not “moored [in] [Section] 10(b)’s requirement that ‘the fraud be 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”’” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 660 (1997) (quoting the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in O’Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618). 
 69. 521 U.S. 642. O’Hagan was a partner in a Minnesota law firm; the firm was hired to 
represent a London company, Grand Metropolitan PLC, regarding a potential tender offer for 
common stock of the Pillsbury Company. Id. at 647. O’Hagan did not work on the Grand Met 
representation. Id. When O’Hagan learned about the potential deal, he purchased options in 
Pillsbury stock, which he eventually sold for a profit of over $4 million. Id. at 647–48. O’Hagan 
claimed that since neither he nor his firm owed a fiduciary duty to Pillsbury, he did not commit 
fraud by purchasing Pillsbury stock. Id. The Court rejected O’Hagan’s arguments, reversing the 
Eighth Circuit decision and reinstating O’Hagan’s conviction. Id. at 678. 
 70. Newkirk, supra note 37. 
 71. 521 U.S. at 652. 
 72. Id. The Court also acknowledged two arguments for prohibiting insider trading. First, 
the Court stated that insider trading is “well tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange 
Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.” Id. at 658. 
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Since O’Hagan, and particularly since the 2008 economic crisis, 
federal prosecutions premised on the misappropriation and 
tipper/tippee theories of insider trading liability have been on the 
rise.
73
 For example, in 2010, Raj Rajaratnam, the former head of the 
multibillion dollar Galleon hedge fund group, was charged as a tippee 
for trading on inside information received from executives at IBM, 
Intel, and McKinsey & Co., resulting in more than $49 million in 
illicit profits or avoided losses.
74
 Rajaratnam claimed that the 
fragments of information were not material to his trading decisions, 
and therefore did not constitute illegal insider trading under the 
mosaic theory.
75
 The jury rejected this argument, and in October 
2011, Rajaratnam was sentenced to eleven years in federal prison, the 
longest sentence ever imposed for insider trading.
76
  
Similarly, in 2012, Rajat Gupta, a former Goldman Sachs director 
and former head of McKinsey & Co., was charged as a tipper for 
providing Rajaratnam with confidential inside information.
77
 Gupta’s 
defense counsel pointed to other potential sources of the inside 
information, arguing that the prosecution had failed to meet its 
burden of proof regarding the nonpublic nature of the information.
78
 
Again, the jury rejected this argument and in October 2012 Gupta 
was sentenced to two years in federal prison.
79
 
Finally, in the 2012 case against Doug Whitman, a former 
California-based hedge fund manager, the government charged 
 
Second, the Court pointed to the “information as property” rationale, stating that a company’s 
confidential information “qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive 
use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty . . . 
constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement—the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the 
money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.” Id. at 654 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  
 73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion on the increasing attention 
on prosecuting insider trading. 
 74. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 2. 
 75. See Henning, supra note 4. 
 76. See Peter Lattman, Galleon Chief Sentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnam-is-
sentenced-to-11-years/. 
 77. Michael Rothfeld & Dan Strumpf, Gupta Gets Two Years for Leaking Inside Tips, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702038 
97404578077050403577468.html. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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Whitman with receiving confidential information about Marvell 
Technology, Google, and Polycom, leading to trades that generated 
over $900,000 in profits for his firm.
80
 Whitman argued at trial that 
he acted in good faith in analyzing stocks, which led him to make 
investment decisions unrelated to any inside information.
81
 In other 
words, Whitman claimed that the information he received was 
inconsequential on its own and was legitimately used to create a 
mosaic, which then assisted him in his trades. The jury again rejected 
this defense, convicting Whitman in August 2012 of two counts of 
conspiracy for trading on illegal tips and two counts of securities 
fraud.
82
 On January 24, 2013, Whitman was sentenced to two years in 
federal prison.
83
 
While the landscape of insider trading law continues to evolve, the 
broad anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 make 
clear that those who misappropriate material nonpublic information, 
either as tippers or tippees, will likely be liable for insider trading. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Notably, even as the scope of liability under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 has broadened over time, none of the developments in 
insider trading law have explicitly banned the mosaic theory. In fact, 
the SEC has continued to reaffirm that company insiders are 
permitted to disclose nonmaterial pieces of information to analysts, 
who may then use such information to “complete a mosaic of 
information that, taken together, is material.”84 Under the 
tipper/tippee theory of liability set forth by Dirks, however, it is not 
clear that this mode of securities analysis is in fact permissible due to 
 
 80. Peter Lattman, Hedge Fund Manager Found Guilty of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/hedge-fund-manager-
whitman-is-found-guilty/; Patricia Hurtado & Bob Van Voris, Whitman Capital Founder Found 
Guilty of Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-08-20/whitman-capital-s-doug-whitman-guilty-of-insider-trading.html. 
 81. Lattman, supra note 80. 
 82. Hurtado, supra note 80. 
 83. Jonathan Stempel, Whitman Capital Founder Gets Two Years for Insider Trades, 
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/us-insidertrading-whitman 
-idUSBRE90N1AT20130125. 
 84. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P22_3882 (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
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the expansive meaning that courts have given to the term ‘nonpublic 
material information.’85 
The Court in Dirks held that insider trading is established if a 
three-part test was met: (1) the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by 
disclosing material nonpublic information to the tippee, (2) the tippee 
knew or should have known that the tipper breached a fiduciary duty, 
and (3) the tipper benefited as a result of providing the information to 
the tippee.
86
 Prior to assessing the liability of securities analysts under 
each of the Dirks prongs, it is necessary to first confirm that analysts 
engaging in the mosaic theory constitute tippees. Analysts engage in 
the mosaic theory by obtaining pieces of information from company 
insiders.
87
 Dirks made clear that an individual becomes a tippee 
“whenever he receives inside information from an insider.”88 As a 
result, such analysts clearly constitute tippees under Dirks by 
receiving information from company insiders acting as tippers.
89
 
Satisfied that securities analysts engaging in the mosaic theory 
constitute tippees, the next step in the analysis turns to the first prong 
of the Dirks test: determining whether the tipper breached a fiduciary 
duty by disclosing material nonpublic information to the tippee.
90
 
This prong has three independent subparts that must be met: (a) the 
breach of a fiduciary duty, (b) by disclosing nonpublic information, 
(c) that is material. Courts have given broad meaning to the term 
fiduciary duty, finding that violations of trust and confidence by 
employees constitute such a breach.
91
 Therefore, an employee-tipper 
who discloses any confidential information to an analyst-tippee will 
likely be viewed as having breached a fiduciary duty by violating the 
trust and confidence of the employer.  
 
 85. See infra note 98. 
 86. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).; see also SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 
285 (2d. Cir. 2012) (stating that the Dirks Court recognized that a tippee will be liable if he 
[1] knows or should know that the information was received from one who breached a fiduciary 
duty (such as an insider or a misappropriator), [2] and the tippee trades or tips for personal 
benefit [3] with the requisite scienter). 
 87. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 2, at 5. 
 88. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 660. 
 91. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that 
“liability exists if the tipper breaches a fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence owed to his 
employer and its shareholders to keep confidential the material nonpublic information . . . .”). 
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Courts have similarly given broad meaning to the scope of 
nonpublic information,
92
 in large part due to the pervasive use of 
confidentiality agreements prohibiting corporate employees from 
disclosing inside information.
93
 Factors such as “written company 
policies, employee training, [and] measures the employer has taken to 
guard the information’s secrecy. . . .” are common indications of 
whether information will be classified as nonpublic.
94
 In the modern 
corporate landscape, the overwhelming majority of individuals 
employed by publicly traded companies operate under 
comprehensive agreements banning the unauthorized disclosure of 
any company information potentially useful to a securities analyst.
95
 
Noting this fact, one New York federal judge stated that “every 
employee of a company has a legal duty not to disclose . . . financial 
or other confidential information . . . that the company has not 
disclosed to the public.”96 Due to the prevalence and breadth of such 
agreements, information disclosed by an employee-tipper to an 
analyst-tippee will likely classify as nonpublic information. 
The last subpart of the first Dirks prong requires that the 
information obtained by the analyst-tippee is material.
97
 Here, again, 
courts have adopted a particularly broad view of materiality.
98
 So 
long as “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider [the information] important,” the information will be 
deemed material.
99
 This standard has been said to be “so vague that 
 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Gardner Davis, Regulatory: Insider Trading Policies and Confidentiality 
Agreements Need Review, INSIDE COUNSEL, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/ 
04/06/regulatory-insider-trading-policies-and-confidentiality-agreements-need-review (noting 
that “[b]oth public and private companies have historically adopted employee policies 
prohibiting the disclosure of confidential company information. . . .”).  
 94. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012), as 
corrected (Nov. 19, 2012), aff'd, 13-491-CR, 2014 WL 628143 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 2014). 
 95. Davis, supra note 94. 
 96. United States v. Fleishman, No. 11 Cr. 32(JSR), 2012 WL 1611375 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 7, 2012). 
 97. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 98. See Peter J. Henning, A Standard That Raises More Questions Than It Answers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/a-standard-that-raises-more-
questions-than-answers/ (noting that “the Supreme Court has consistently resisted providing 
more precision to materiality” in the insider trading context). 
 99. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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almost any tidbit about a company could fall within it.”100 Therefore, 
while analysts may claim that the mosaic theory does not constitute 
insider trading based on the immaterial nature of the tipped 
information, courts and juries have readily rejected such arguments, 
as indicated by the recent convictions of Rajaratnam, Gupta, and 
Whitman,
101
 among others.
102
 As such, the first prong of Dirks is 
easily met when analyst-tippees engaging in the mosaic theory obtain 
inside information from employee-tipppers.  
The second prong of the Dirks test, which requires that the 
analyst-tippee knew or should have known that the tipper breached a 
fiduciary duty, is equally easy to satisfy. Securities analysts are hired 
to learn, study, and understand the workings of corporate 
enterprises.
103
 Therefore, they should know that corporate employees 
 
 100. Henning, supra note 4. 
 101. At the trials of Rajaratnam and Gupta, defense attorneys interrogated the prosecution’s 
witnesses about whether the information provided to the defendants was publicly available, 
arguably making it immaterial. Moreover, prior to his arrest on October 16, 2009, Rajaratnam 
claimed that his Galleon analysts investing in technology companies had an “advantage over 
rivals because most were trained as engineers and all focused their energies exclusively on 
research.” David Glovin, Patricia Hurtado & Bob Van Voris, Rajaratnam Guilty in Insider 
Trading Case, BLOOMBERG (May 11, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-
11/rajaratnam-is-found-guilty-of-all-counts-in-galleon-insider-trading-trial.html. However, 
when former Galleon analyst and trader, Adam Smith, testified at Rajaratnam’s trial he 
admitted that the hedge fund “gained its advantage through other means.” Id. Smith explained 
how “Rajaratnam emphasized ‘getting the number’—or learning revenue figures before they 
became public—from insiders at Intel Corp., Intersil Corp. and other public traded companies.” 
Id. “Research is sort of doing your homework ahead of time,” said Smith, and “[g]etting the 
number is more like cheating on the test.” Id. Smith testified after pleading guilty to insider 
trading and agreeing to cooperate with prosecutors. Id. 
 102. In the July 2012 guilty plea of John Kinnucan, for example, Kinnucan admitted to 
working from 2008 to 2010 to “obtain private information from employees of public companies 
so that he could relay the information to others, who would then make profitable trades ahead of 
the public announcement of the developments.” Analyst Who Taunted Authorities Pleads 
Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/business/ 
john-kinnucan-pleads-guilty-to-insider-trading.html?_r=0. Kinnucan’s company, Broadband 
Research LLC, operated as an “expert network firm,” providing client-investors with securities 
information about technology companies. Susan Pulliam, FBI Visit Exposes Trade-Probe 
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 
748703567304575629061523575940.html. Following Kinnucan’s plea, prosecutors and 
regulators continue to examine “the role of consultants and analysts who provide hedge funds 
and mutual funds with detailed information about the businesses and industries in which they 
specialize.” Id. 
 103. See Securities Analysts, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/securitiesanalysts.htm. 
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are bound by comprehensive confidentiality agreements and that 
violating such an agreement is a breach of the employees’ fiduciary 
duty.
104
 It is highly unlikely that a tippee, such as Rajaratnam, 
Whitman, or any of their firm’s securities analysts, could successfully 
argue that he did not know and should not have known about the 
obligations that an inside tipper at a large public company was 
operating under. 
Finally, the third Dirks prong requires that the tipper obtain a 
benefit from providing the information to the tippee. And while 
monetary benefits certainly satisfy this requirement, courts have 
broadly construed the scope of the benefit, holding that “it includes 
not only ‘pecuniary gain,’ such as a cut of the take or a gratuity from 
the tippee, but also a ‘reputational benefit’ or the benefit one would 
obtain from simply ‘mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend.’”105 Therefore, anytime an analyst-tippee 
receives information from an inside tipper, prosecutors can easily 
show that tipper received some sort of benefit, even if it’s merely the 
benefit of “an ongoing personal relationship or enhancement to the 
tipper’s reputation. . . .”106 
Therefore, due to the breadth with which courts have interpreted 
liability under the Dirks tipper/tippee analysis, along with the vigor 
with which prosecutors and regulators have brought such claims, 
securities analysts should think twice before engaging in the mosaic 
theory. The securities analyst working today must operate under the 
assumption that insiders are expressly prohibited from disclosing any 
pertinent company information and that doing so will likely meet the 
requirements of nonpublic material information in violation of the 
insider’s fiduciary duty. To assume otherwise may cause such 
analysts to end up in the same boat—or cell—as Rajaratnam, Gupta, 
Whitman, and many others.  
 
 104. Davis, supra note 93. 
 105. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). 
 106. Peter J. Henning, White Collar Watch: Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E0DD133FF931A35751C1A9669D8B63.  
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IV. PROPOSAL 
Due to the increasing blurriness between material and nonmaterial 
information,
107
 as well as the increasing prevalence of comprehensive 
corporate confidentiality agreements broadening the scope of 
nonpublic information,
108
 securities analysts must refrain from 
engaging in ‘research’ practices in furtherance of the mosaic theory. 
At the same time, however, securities analysts serve an important 
function in the financial marketplace and consequently should be able 
to engage in securities research without the constant fear of facing 
prosecution for insider trading. Therefore, a proper balance must be 
struck. This can be achieved in a variety of ways, two of which will 
be proposed here.  
First, the problem can be addressed from within the sphere of 
public corporations, which employ, train, and regulate the individuals 
often accused of operating as inside tippers.
109
 Corporations 
employing these potential tippers should increase the emphasis on the 
importance of their internal confidentiality agreements.
110
 
Furthermore, the agreements should clearly state that employees are 
prohibited from disclosing any company information to outside 
analysts.
111
 The agreements should also explain that the employee 
may be liable for criminal charges if the policy is disregarded. 
Individuals studying the trends in insider trading law have also 
identified these weaknesses in current corporate policies, noting that 
“confidentiality agreements need to explicitly prohibit employees 
from ever . . . consulting with a third party or otherwise providing 
information about the company without the company’s prior written 
authorization.”112  
 
 107. See Henning, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Davis, supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. (emphasizing that “[t]o protect against the risk of insider trading based on 
nonpublic information about other companies, corporate policies and confidentiality agreements 
should prohibit disclosure of material non-public information about other companies obtained 
in the course of employment. . . .”).   
 111. Id. (stating that “[t]raditional policies, standard [confidentiality agreements] and 
existing employee training programs may no longer be adequate and should be reviewed in 
light of recent developments”). 
 112. Id. 
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In addition to presenting employees with clear confidentiality 
agreements, corporate employers should better train their employees 
on the evolving landscape of insider trading liability.
113
 This includes 
instructing employees on the proper steps to take when contacted by 
an analyst who is trying to obtain inside information. Without the 
appropriate training and compliance measures in place, corporations 
will continue to find their employees liable for serving as illegal 
tippers. 
As the same time, the problem can similarly be addressed from 
the sphere of the securities firms who allow their analysts to root out 
inside information from corporate employees. Analysts should also 
operate under internal policy guidelines enforced by their hedge fund 
or securities firm employers. Like corporate confidentiality 
agreements, these policies should prohibit analysts from obtaining 
information from corporate insiders without the explicit 
understanding that the insider is authorized to disclose the 
information.  
One way to achieve this goal is to require analysts to rely solely 
on corporate investor relations officers for their information.
114
 
Investor relations officers serve the “strategic executive function” of 
providing “the investment community with an accurate portrayal of 
both a company’s current performance and its future prospects.”115 
Because such individuals are tasked with distributing company 
information, analysts and their employers can rest assured that 
obtaining information from them will not violate insider trading laws.  
Neither of these solutions is flawless and both will likely be met 
with significant resistance from securities analysts and their 
employers. Analysts will surely argue that relying on investor 
relations officers defeats the value and skill of their hard work and 
research, which is what allows their companies to succeed. They will 
likely claim that they are trained to cross-reference and verify the 
information released by investor relations officers, as well as ferret 
 
 113. See id. (highlighting that “appropriate training of employees about the expanded 
policies and the risks of sharing nonpublic information is essential to establish the desired 
culture of compliance”). 
 114. BENJAMIN MARK COLE, THE NEW INVESTOR RELATIONS: EXPERT PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE STATE OF THE ART 3 (2004). 
 115. Id. 
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out other information to aid them in evaluating the value of the 
companies. In the end, however, these arguments are likely to fall on 
deaf ears as prosecutors, regulators, and judges show no signs of 
relaxing their broad interpretations of insider trading. While “nothing 
may deter the determined rogue employee, appropriate policies, 
confidentiality agreements and training programs will mitigate the 
reputational harm and legal risk. . . .”116 to both public corporations 
and the securities firms and analysts that invest in them. 
CONCLUSION 
There was a time not long ago when securities analysts would 
unhesitatingly call their contacts at large public companies for the 
inside scoop on that company’s ‘status.’117 Maybe the analyst would 
be so lucky as to get upcoming revenue numbers or maybe he would 
merely get tidbits of manufacturing data. Maybe the analyst believed 
the information had already been disclosed to someone else, and 
therefore was already public. Or maybe he believed that the 
information was immaterial, since it was simply one piece that would 
be used in deciding whether to buy or sell the company’s stock. 
Either way, these analysts were afforded an advantage over the 
average investor by obtaining such information. And it was this 
advantage that made the mosaic theory of securities analysis unlawful 
under insider trading law.  
Technically, securities analysts may still legally obtain fragments 
of immaterial information from corporate insiders and use those 
fragments to create a mosaic of useful information.
118
 The reality, 
however, is that increasingly broad interpretations of the insider 
trading anti-fraud provisions reveal that those who engage in the 
mosaic theory face grave dangers and an uphill battle when it comes 
to defending against insider trading claims.
119
 As a result, the mosaic 
theory in its current form should be abandoned and replaced with 
 
 116. Davis, supra note 93. 
 117. See Sorkin, supra note 20. 
 118. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 34. 
 119. See Henning, supra note 4. 
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legitimate research techniques that properly give all investors fair 
access to information.  
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